The origin and nature of the state in Francisco de Vitoria´s moral philosophy by unknown
ideas y valores · vol. lxii · n.o 151 • abril de 2013 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso)  2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 81 - 103
The Origin and Nature of the State 
in Francisco de Vitoria’s Moral 
Philosophy 
El origen y la naturaleza del Estado en la filosofía  
moral de Francisco de Vitoria
1Luis Valenzuela-Vermehren*
Universidad Católica de Temuco - Chile 
Abstract
Sixteenth-century Spanish thought is constitutive of an established, though insuf-
ficiently studied, tradition of European political theorizing. As against the politics 
of Machiavellism, the Spanish tradition argued in favor of an ethical perspective 
on statecraft. As an introduction to the subject, this article addresses key concepts 
set forth by the Dominican theologian-jurist Francisco de Vitoria regarding the 
natural foundations and teleology of the state and its coercive power. Terms such as 
“natural law”, “dominium”, and “perfect community” describe the Thomistic basis 
of his political philosophy and illustrate the moral significance and legitimate basis 
of political society in early modern Spanish politico-theological thought.
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Resumen
El pensamiento español del siglo XVI constituye una tradición establecida de teori-
zación política europea poco estudiada en los círculos académicos angloparlantes. 
En contraste con el maquiavelismo, la tradición española argumentó a favor de 
una perspectiva ética en torno al arte de gobernar. Como introducción a dicha 
temática, se abordan los conceptos clave establecidos por Francisco de Vitoria res-
pecto de los fundamentos naturales y la teleología del Estado y su poder coercitivo. 
Conceptos tales como “ley natural”, “dominio” y “comunidad perfecta” describen 
la base tomista de su filosofía política e ilustran el significado moral y fundamento 
legítimo de la sociedad política en el pensamiento político-teológico de la época. 
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During the time of Machiavelli, an era to which the study of polit-
ical thought has devoted considerable attention, there exists another 
corpus of political speculation on the rising European state authored 
by Spanish political and moral philosophers. The Dominican theo-
logian and father of the so-called School of Salamanca and Spanish 
Neo-Scholasticism (segunda escolástica), Francisco de Vitoria (1483-
1546), initiated a major shift in sixteenth-century Spanish political 
thought, which was a conscious attempt to bring theology to bear 
upon questions other than Christian metaphysics, particularly upon 
issues centering on the ethical problems associated with modern 
political statecraft. What is the nature and basis of law and politi-
cal society? How are we to conceive the role of political authority in 
domestic politics? What is the basis and aim of sovereignty? What are 
the foundations of order in international politics? These are examples 
of the kinds of intellectual challenges that drew the attention of the 
Spanish thinkers in an age of the emerging state, of empire, of war 
and hence of questions surrounding political power and its proper 
place in human affairs. 
In general, Vitoria’s conceptualization of political society, in-
formed by Thomistic and Aristotelian teleology, proved significant for 
the development of a modern conception of state politics and political 
ethics. As a consequence, his ideas, as well as those of his disciples and 
colleagues, contributed, for example, to the perennial debate between 
intellectualism and voluntarism in the philosophy of law, the just war 
tradition, the evolution of international law, and the Western tradi-
tion of human rights thinking.1 An overview of his moral philosophy 
centered particularly on the teleological character of power (i.e. law, 
government, and authority) is thus requisite. I believe that a proper 
understanding of this teleology constitutes a fundamental point of 
departure for acquiring a greater awareness of the meaning of early 
modern Spanish political philosophy, which furthermore provided a 
vigorous critique of both state practice and the literature founded on 
the doctrine of Reason of State.2 To this extent, it is arguably con-
stitutive of an established tradition of European political theorizing, 
though often unexamined in any systematic manner. 
In what follows, I wish to focus primarily on Vitoria’s ontological 
conception of the state and thus limit my discussion to answering the 
following questions centered on his political philosophy in particular, 
1 For a discussion on the Spanish contribution to the development of international law 
and human rights discourse, see for example, García y García (1997), Davidson (1994) 
and Brown (1934a).
2 For an overview of the attitudes of the Spanish theologian-jurists toward Machi-
avellism and Reason of State, see Mirete (2001).
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and on Spanish political thought in general: 1) What is the nature 
of man in Vitoria’s thought and how is this related to the nature 
of the political ordering of the state? 2) What is the particular role 
and purpose of state power in Vitoria’s moral and philosophical 
conceptualization of the state? This involves addressing the notion 
of dominium in man and the state, how dominium is related to the 
question of human reason, the causes and purposes of public power 
or authority, and the nature of the state as a sovereign entity. The pur-
pose of this procedure is to highlight Vitoria’s naturalistic conception 
of power and provide a rendition of the ethical constraints to which 
power itself is subject in his view of it. 
De Potestate Civili
Francisco de Vitoria’s De Potestate Civili (On Civil Power 1528), is 
essentially an account of the origin and nature of political authority in 
society and of the scholastic doctrine regarding the obligatory nature 
of civil laws. Quentin Skinner has noted that the Spanish Thomists 
indeed developed a systematic theory of political society in opposi-
tion to the perceived heresies of the time (cf. 1980 148). While this is 
arguably true, I hold that Vitoria’s conception of political power is 
a systematic political theory to the extent that it also interprets and 
expresses the key issues facing the rising Renaissance state. These 
included the questions of its necessity and autonomy (of the origin 
and nature of its sovereign status), of the general structure of gov-
ernment power operating within its boundaries, and the purposes or 
ends such power should pursue (cf. Sánchez 15). 
In this latter respect, two interconnected spheres shape Vitoria’s 
conception of state power. First is the general philosophical or onto-
logical conception of the state insofar as it is considered to arise from 
both natural and eternal laws, and to possess a determinate end and 
guiding principle, namely the common good. 
Secondly, there is the notion that the state’s actual institutions 
are the result of human will, consent, and legal enactment, and that 
they are not severed from ethical postulates. The implication is that 
both supreme power (summa potestas) and law, inasmuch as they are 
the consequence of positive enactments, have as their chief ordering 
principle the precepts of natural right and justice. Indeed, the prin-
ciples of natural justice, such as alterity and equality, inform positive 
arrangements and determinations. That is, Vitoria, in his Thomistic 
view of society, considered the just as guiding and directing actual 
political life. Natural right and justice, which are but that part of nat-
ural law that refers to the realm of rights and obligations in the social 
order, serves a constitutional function. Justice issues a restrictive and 
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prescriptive mandate directed at government, regardless of its par-
ticular form (e.g. democracy, aristocracy or monarchy). The whole of 
political society must hence find as its basis natural law and human 
will, human agreement (consensus communis) and nature. 
The Natural and Divine Origin of the State
A rendition of Vitoria’s conception of the state must be preceded 
by an account of the Thomistic conception of dominium in man, and 
how it is the basis upon which his state theory is created. The notion 
points to man’s ethical nature, identifies the source of “rights” pertain-
ing to him, and underscores the concomitant nature of the political 
order characteristic of Vitoria’s conception of the state. The concept 
of dominium is deployed in a number of Vitoria’s texts, particularly 
in De Indis where he argued for the sovereign character of the indig-
enous communities of the New World. However, we will not find a 
systematic definition of it in his political writings since he probably 
assumed that his audience was already familiar with the term. Brufau, 
however, offers a systematic theological exposition of dominium as 
used in Aquinas, Vitoria and Domingo de Soto, Vitoria’s disciple and 
colleague. In my account, I will closely follow Brufau’s analysis and 
discussion (1957).3
The Nature of Man: Divine Dominium, Human Dominium and Reason
In Thomistic thought, dominium, or power over something 
or someone, refers to two basic but varying notions of dominium: 
dominium as property and possession, and dominium as superiority 
or pre-eminence (cf. Brufau 98). In the first definition, dominium is 
exercised for personal benefit or utility; in the second, for the good of 
others, or for the common good. When we speak of human dominium 
we are referring to these two fundamental aspects which are but more 
“earthly” expressions of a higher order of dominium, that of Divine 
dominium. 
The link between the idea of Divine dominium and human domi-
nium is directly related to the relationship between the eternal law and 
natural law (and natural right) in Christian ethics. The underlying 
assertion is that man and government, both of which are considered 
as pertaining to the natural order, must assimilate, reflect and realize 
the ethical qualities and prescriptions of the eternal law which has 
imbued all things with a nature and hence with an end. 
Divine dominium is a kind of dominium residing in God, exer-
cising power over all things according to the will of the Creator, and 
3 All translations of Spanish language texts are mine.
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inclining them toward their natural end, the good. Divine dominion 
is dominion per esentiam¸ or by essence, and exists in a transcendent 
and independent fashion inasmuch as this dominion is considered 
perfect, infinite and belonging, in Aristotelian terms, to the first 
unmoved mover (cf. Brufau 99-101). Such dominion bears the qual-
ity, in its absolute independence from things created by it, of absolute 
freedom. Man, as a contingent and finite being (i.e. as not essence, as 
not pure being, unlike God), finds himself, by contrast, in a state of 
dependence on his Creator in the sense of the relationship that any-
thing created maintains with that which creates, or with that which the 
is efficient cause of the created. This means essentially two things: that 
Divine dominium implies a relationship of “imitative subordination” 
of man to God and to the precepts of order for society created by God. 
Divine dominion is thus the exemplar of human dominion, some-
thing to be emulated, and the articulation of human dominion itself is 
performed per participationem, or by participation. Man, hence, as a 
created being, participates in the essence of the uncreated being, God, 
as the object of the Divine will. Hence, Aquinas states that:
To participate means to partake of something, partem capere; as 
a consequence, when something receives in a particular manner that 
which belongs to something else in a universal manner, it is said that it 
participates in it […]. (Aquinas, cited in Brufau 115)
Human dominion then is a limited dominion that reflects the 
Divine and universal dominion that has created man. However, what 
does “participation” mean specifically? Participation is but the exer-
cise of human reason and intellect in the cognitive qualities of man. 
Man participates in, or partakes of, Divine dominion, the highest form 
of superiority or pre-eminence, through cognition of the Eternal Law, 
which represents, in turn, the Augustinian view of Divine intelligence 
or reason and will ordering the universe and all things of creation to 
their natural end. This is the well-known Thomistic definition of nat-
ural law (lex naturalis), for the natural law is but the participation in 
the Eternal Law by rational creatures. Consequently, “the natural law 
[…] is the law which paves the way for human dominion [the rational 
creature] must realize the eternal law in accordance with his condi-
tion as a free and rational being” (Brufau 112). 
To participate in the Eternal law, hence, is to be cognizant of the 
natural ordering of things according to Divine will. Since the order-
ing of things in Thomistic theology is self-defined as being concerned 
teleologically with the good and the just, human reason must strive to 
gain knowledge of the Will that orders him to direct himself toward 
the good and the just. Knowledge of the Eternal Law is knowledge 
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of the natural moral law and of natural right (or justice), of which 
they are part and towards which the activities stemming from the 
human will must order themselves, for the Eternal Law is but a “rule 
of action which impresses in all creatures a tendency toward their end 
[...]” (Brufau 110). According to this view, only rational creatures may 
partake of Divine dominion because only men, as creatures endowed 
with intelligence and free will, may exercise dominion; only men are 
domini in the sense of possessing superiority and pre-eminence, and 
of being able to make use of things or other creatures directing him-
self and these, as well, to their natural ends (id. 118).4
God directs man through his own reason and will (and in this 
latter sense he is considered to bear a resemblance to God-imago Dei), 
to order his life and his surroundings toward their intended end. In 
order for this to be the case, the power, absolute freedom and ethi-
cal content of Divine dominion is transferred to man qua man; and 
through his participation in the Eternal Law, which is tantamount to 
saying that by knowing the natural law and exteriorizing its precepts 
via his will, man himself exercises his own dominion, his own pre-
eminence on the natural plane of existence.
However, one might add that his pre-eminence over his surround-
ings, or over others, is predicated upon that part of dominion relevant 
to the power man exercises over his own actions. Human dominion, 
indeed, implies the possession of a power, potestas, or faculty, and in fact 
presupposes it. Thomistic thought considers dominion over one’s own 
actions as the ultimate root and cause of dominion over other things 
(cf. Brufau 119). From this perspective, human dominium over property 
or other beings is but an extension or prolongation of the dominion over 
his own voluntary acts, “[one] which is actual and which does not imply 
an intrinsic incorporation [of the object of that dominion to the domi-
nus], but rather a kind of dependency or ordering of such beings toward 
man” (ibíd.). This dependency makes explicit a relationship of hierarchy 
between the dominus and the objects of his dominion. It underscores the 
idea that the “objects” surrounding him in nature, be these creatures or 
other physical things, are in a sense, “inferior” to the dominus, owing to 
their non-rational nature. They exist primarily as a means for perfecting 
his nature, and by doing so they too perfect themselves, for their per-
fection, Aquinas argued, is achieved by exercising that “servitude” and 
dependency necessary for the perfection of the dominus himself (ibíd). 
4 The question of use or “usus” in man is analogous, in this view, to the notion of “usus” 
in God: He uses things by directing them to their natural ends. 
[87]The Origin and Nature of the State in Francisco de Vitoria’s Moral Philosophy 
ideas y valores · vol. lxii · n.o 151 • abril de 2013  • issn 0120-0062 (impreso) 2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 81 - 103
Human Dominium, Reason, Will and Rights
Human reason, in this light, is capable of apprehending knowl-
edge of the good and of the natural ends of things, of man, and of the 
proper means for their achievement. Nevertheless, human dominion 
must order that knowledge. It must make that knowledge manifest, 
through an additional element related to the notion of potestas: his 
will. If human dominion is marked by the power that man possesses 
over his own acts, it is because these very acts are the expression of 
his natural freedom and free will, and hence of his innate liberty 
(cf. Brufau 120). This idea does not admit a voluntarist ethic, for while 
dominion formally rests on the idea of will (voluntas) it does not 
imply the absence of rationality or of reason from human dominion. 
Brufau clarifies this idea:
 [T]he will is supported by understanding [reason]: an act of will 
depends upon the representation made by reason [in the intellect of the 
dominus] of the object to the will itself, considering that object under 
the light of evil or the light of the good. (Brufau 120) 
Reason then is intrinsically oriented toward cognition and 
articulation of universal moral principles. Hence, the power that 
man naturally possesses over things, the natural dominion proper to 
man, is imbued with ethical content. The question of orienting the 
will toward and making use of things is also intrinsically linked to 
the perfection of those very things. Moreover, such perfection as is 
possible to achieve for himself (i.e. moral perfection or physical con-
servation) is granted to him as a natural inclination by the natural 
moral law. Such dominion and power as man possesses naturally thus 
implies the possession of rights, that is, they designate man as the 
bearer of subjective rights. On this question, one scholar posits that,
[f]or Vitoria, natural law has the sense of obligation, but the domi-
nium which is consequent upon it is not specifically said to be ‘natural’ 
nor ordained specifically to the natural act of self-conservation […] 
Instead, Vitoria puts forward the traditional distinction between the 
spiritual and natural, where dominium belongs only to spiritual [i.e. ra-
tional] beings and is connected with liberty […] Vitoria’s dominium…is 
the (unqualified) subjective right, or better, subjective right simpliciter. 
It belongs to everyone, rather than its being one set of rights belonging 
separately to each individual. (Brett 130)
While Brett is correct to say that dominium is a subjective right, 
she also notes that “Dominium of men over all things is never called 
‘natural dominium’” (ibíd.). But if it is, in fact, a subjective right, a 
right attaching to men by a means other than positive law, then it 
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must possess a natural quality; that is, dominium must be natural. For 
example, the possession and use of things, the power or pre-eminence 
that men are seen as possessing over them, implies a right, and that 
right logically implies an innate faculty to exercise it, that is, a right 
(ius) to do, possess or exact something either for his own benefit or for 
the benefit of others.
Indeed, one finds “natural dominium” explicitly brought into play 
by Aquinas in ST II-II, Q. 66, a.1.
External things can be considered in two ways. First, as regards 
their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but only to 
the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as regards 
their use, and in this way, man has natural dominion (naturale domi-
nium) over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to 
use them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the 
imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect. 
Likewise, Vitoria, in his relectio De Indis, says “natural dominion 
is a gift of God just as civil ownership is, or indeed even more so, since 
civil ownership clearly belongs to human law” (1991b 242).
The naturalness of dominium is part and parcel of the theological 
language of Thomism, and the potestas, will, and reason associated 
with human dominion are accordingly exercised through that natural 
law upon which it is specifically said to be incumbent (i.e. by par-
ticipation in the Eternal law). In any case, Brett’s conclusion that man 
possesses subjective rights, and is the bearer of such rights, precisely 
reflects his condition as dominus, for he must use things to perfect 
them and himself, impelling all things toward their prescribed ends.
I should stress, moreover, that this does not imply that a right 
pertaining to an individual is one permissible merely by positive legal 
enactment. Legal enactments that assign rights must make explicit 
the rights naturally pertaining to the individual. Vitoria explicitly 
denied the positivist assertion when discussing the concept of ius in 
his commentaries on Aquinas’s Summary of Theology. There he ten-
tatively embraced the definition set forth by Conrad Summenhart: 
[I]t should be noted that Conrad, who is the author of that noble 
tract, On Contracts, posits in question I a definition of that term ‘right’ 
[…] He says that right is a power or faculty pertaining to a person accor-
ding to the laws. (Vitoria, cited in Brett 128) 
However, Vitoria did not consider such a definition of “right” 
to be an equivalent of dominium but rather an abusive definition of 
it. This is so because, again, the kinds of rights he was addressing 
in his discussion of human dominion transcend mere positive legal 
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experience. These rights pertain to man’s natural status as man in his 
dominion’s semblance to Divine dominion (cf. Brett 129), and, in a 
sense, are prior to all legal or positivist concessions of rights, and are 
deemed to pertain to man’s very dignity. In Naszalyi’s words, a right 
is a faculty or power whose violation stirs injustice (cf. Naszalyi 78). 
Dominion and Nature in Political Society
The meaning assigned to divine and human dominion is none-
theless the point of departure for Vitoria’s conceptualization of the 
state and the role of public authority. Brufau’s account of Vitoria and 
Aquinas on dominion stresses the connection between Divine domin-
ion and the dominion which is characteristic of political authority in 
the state. Not merely man, but also the political order exists as a natu-
ral structure for the sake of the society that must develop within it. 
It is part of the universal order and cannot elude Divine Providence, 
which has furnished it with the tools necessary for preserving each of 
its creatures. Its very existence requires the articulation of an author-
ity capable of directing its constituent parts toward the common 
good (cf. Brufau 125). Drawing upon Aquinas’s De regimine principum 
(Bk. I, Ch.8), Brufau adds:
In this fashion, political power (potestas politica) is a form or the 
formal cause of the state. This dominium or political power partakes 
of the Supreme and Universal dominium of God; the exercise of such 
power, regimen multitudinis, also constitutes a participation in the 
Divine Government of all things. Accordingly, the dominium pertai-
ning to its rulers, regum dominium, fulfils a ministerial role: the bearer 
of power, in the exercise of his office, is a minister of God. (125)
The doctrine describing the nature and character of Divine 
dominion and of human dominion in their teleological significance is 
at once the doctrine describing the character and purposive, ethical 
nature of the political order. The purposive quality of the politi-
cal order certainly draws upon the ideas of Aquinas and Aristotle 
regarding the natural origin of society (cf. Vitoria 1960 115). Similarly, 
Vitoria’s teleological conception of the state emphasizes first the natu-
ral origin of society itself (although this is not the central theme of De 
potestate civili) and of the public authority governing society. From 
the outset, Vitoria establishes the well-known Aristotelian idea con-
cerning the natural origin of political society. He tells us first that 
man, unlike other creatures of nature, is by nature, indeed by neces-
sity, a civil and social animal.
[T]o mankind Nature gave ‘only reason and virtue’, leaving him 
otherwise frail, weak, helpless, and vulnerable, destitute of all defense 
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and lacking in all things […] So it was that, in order to make up for 
these natural deficiencies, mankind was obliged to give up the solitary 
nomadic life of animals and to live in partnerships (societates), each 
supporting the other. (Vitoria 1960 7) 
This statement clearly reflects Aristotle’s statements concerning the 
natural status of the polis. “What makes the State natural”, Barker holds, 
is the fact that, however it came into existence, it is as it stands the 
satisfaction of an immanent impulse in human nature towards moral 
perfection -an immanent impulse which drives men upwards, through 
various forms of society, into the final political form. (xlix) 
Aristotle’s position is furthered by his view of man hypothetically 
living outside of the purview of the state. This is implausible because 
an isolated man is not a self-sufficient man; self-sufficiency is only pos-
sible in the context of society. “The man who is isolated”, he remarks, 
“who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has 
no need to share because he is already self-sufficient -is no part of the 
polis, and must therefore be either a beast or a god” (Pol. 1253a 14). 
Vitoria thus stressed the natural sociability of men that thinkers such 
as Hobbes would later deny in favor of a “state of nature” predicated 
upon the human passions and the unbridled quest for power.
Such a view of the social order, of the natural quality of its very 
existence, was unquestionably related to the ethical problem of what 
pursuits, writ large, should the characteristic pursuits of that society 
be, or of the conditions under which a society based on mutual need 
and assistance could exist and flourish. One concept was of particular 
concern here: the notion of the “good” or the common good concei-
ved as the realization of justice. Aristotle was clear in Politics on this 
question both when emphasizing the notion that society makes the 
moral perfection of man possible and when underscoring the idea of 
justice as a particular ordering of political society (cf. Pol. 1253a 15, 16). 
Vitoria similarly held that:
[I]n the case of will, whose ornaments are justice and amity 
(amisticia), what a deformed and lame thing it would be outside the 
fellowships of men. Justice can only be exercised in a multitude; and 
amity, which we use on more occasions than fire and water themsel-
ves, as Cicero says (De amisticia 6.22), and apart from which Aristotle 
says no virtue can exist (Pol. 1253a §38-40), would disappear completely 
without some sort of shared life […] The clear conclusion is that the 
primitive origin of human cities and commonwealths was not a human 
convention or contrivance to be numbered among the artifacts of craft, 
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but a device implanted by Nature in man for his own safety and survi-
val. (Vitoria 1991a 8-9)
The notions of justice and the good are the central features char-
acterizing the development, the modus vivendi of the political society 
outlined by Vitoria, and one cannot but recall here the idea of natural 
right and the good. Man’s practical reason, in what amounts to the 
Thomistic discourse on the subject of the principles of natural right 
operating in the psychology of the individual, is considered as being 
able to distinguish between good and evil, between the just and the 
unjust. Inasmuch as there exists a natural tendency in man toward 
acquiring knowledge of these principles, and knowledge that these 
are the principles that guide his actions and which should constitute 
the general aims of his conduct, it is also the case that these are the 
principles and aims of the social order. 
Like man, whose individual will or dominion must command 
his individual acts, there exists in political society a natural insti-
tution furnishing society itself with the will or power necessary for 
the achievement of these ends. Vitoria saw public authority or power 
as governing the complex array of individual wills and bringing the 
body politic into unity from above, just as the human mind governs 
the activities of the different parts of the body. 
Indeed, on the question of the origin of political authority Vitoria, 
in De potestate civili, makes the typical Aristotelian assertion that: 
[N]ot merely in the physical sciences but in all human sciences 
as well: […] necessary causes, the first and most potent of all causes, 
must be considered as functions of purpose.5 Whether this principle 
was established by Aristotle himself, or whether he got it from Plato, it 
has proved a mighty tool in philosophy, shedding light on all subjects. 
(Vitoria 1991a 4)
Again, Vitoria considered the natural origin of state power in its 
teleological dimension. Immediately after describing the natural ori-
gin of political society Vitoria adheres to the position that:
[T]he final and necessary cause of public power is the same. If as-
semblies and associations of men are necessary to the safety of mankind, 
it is equally true that such partnerships cannot exist without some over-
seeing power or governing force. Hence the purpose and utility of public 
power are identical to those of human society itself. (Vitoria 1991a 9) 
5  See: Phys. 198b1 - 199b32.
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Sánchez notes how this conception of the state is entirely at vari-
ance with the political theories of Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau who 
stressed the conventional nature of the state. In their view, the state is 
mere human artifice, the outgrowth of custom or something imposed 
or willed by power (cf. Sánchez 28). Unlike voluntarist doctrine, or the 
political beliefs of Luther and Calvin who saw government as neces-
sary for obliging sinful men to order, Vitoria embraced the view that 
society and power were wholly natural phenomena. Indeed, before 
the reception of Aristotle’s Politics, political dominion had been seen 
as the result of an act of force, of God, of human agreement or an 
amalgam of these. The idea of lordship as the forceful assumption of 
power and subjugation of men had been handed down by Patristic 
sources and associated with an account of the Fall, 
and of the appearance with Cain and Nimrod of sinful ambition 
and dominion, and it reflected too the Stoic assumption that men enjo-
yed equality, freedom and self-sufficing in an original state of innocence 
which had been lost through the appearance of human wickedness. 
(Luscombe 757) 
The idea of government, then, came to be a fundamental remedy 
for the sinfulness of men, which, in turn, had dissolved their original 
state of equality. 
Nevertheless, Vitoria’s conception of government considered the 
state itself as emanating not from the loss of innocence but rather as some-
thing called for by human nature itself. It is not enough, Naszalyi notes, 
that each individual should act virtuously in order to achieve a way of life 
marked by order and perfection. What is necessary is that there exist a 
higher form of organization capable of bringing men into social unity, of 
directing their deeds toward social order and harmony (cf. Naszalyi 101). 
In sum, this position is antithetical to the positivistic view that political 
power is only the expression of human consent or human will, voluntas, 
or law. Rather, the very existence of the state is ontologically a “natural” 
thing wholly independent of human consent though its actual operations 
will require the force of human will (cf. id. 174). 
Since the teleology of the state in Vitoria’s political thought is the 
achievement of the common good, the reason why men are brought 
into such unity is that very conception of the good.6 In this respect, 
the question of what the common good is precisely is then resolved 
6 Vitoria’s account of the state in De potestate civili does not discuss the concept of the 
common good save to remark that it is the both the end and cause of public authority. 
In any case, the concept itself is implicit in the Thomistic conception of the state, 
especially in the idea of the role of public authority in society.
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into a question of the unity of the social order as a function of pub-
lic power whose primary task must be the realization of a just social 
order. The realization of justice and the unity of the state and society 
make possible the achievement of the common good.
A corollary to this is the position of the individual seen as not 
being entirely subsumed or absorbed by the whole or by the public 
authority representing the whole to the detriment of his individuality. 
The state merely assumes the task of maintaining order and justice 
within a community composed of men who are formally equal to 
one another. The individual is considered free with regard to political 
power for the “community which [such power] represents transcends 
all particular relationships” (Lissarrague 16). It is a qualitative trait 
of this view of the state that one of its chief tasks is to promote not 
merely the common good, but by virtue of the common good, the 
individual flourishing of the human personality despite its coercive 
faculties. True to the natural law conception of man as being essen-
tially free, Vitoria noted in De Iure Belli, “free men […] do not live for 
the convenience of others, but for themselves” (Vitoria 1991c 303). In 
his view, the state, in overseeing the general well-being of a society 
predicated upon justice, provided man with the foundations neces-
sary for the flourishing of his individuality (cf. Naszalyi 217-218). 
The Efficient and Material Causes of Public Authority
Vitoria’s assertion regarding the natural and divine origin of state 
power embraces two interlocking issues, i. e., the efficient and mate-
rial causes of public authority.
If […] public power is founded upon natural law, and if natural 
law acknowledges God as its only author, then it is evident that public 
power is from God, and cannot be over-ridden by conditions imposed 
by men or by any positive law. (Vitoria 1991a 10) 
This position does not hold that public power is directly the result 
of Divine Will, or of a voluntaristic conception of God as directly 
ordering and impinging upon the operations of political society. As 
the efficient cause of nature, God has created an order (nature) within 
which political authority emerged, and which exists, or is articulated, 
independently of Divine Will. God, in this view, has merely furnished 
public power with a certain potency enabling it to pursue the ends for 
which it was created through the actual office of the sovereign.
Sánchez has examined this question in engaging the concepts of 
“power” and “potency” (potestas and potentia) in Spanish political 
thought. For Martín de Azpilcueta, Sánchez notes, there is no differ-
ence between power and potency. Both terms are derived from the 
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common root, possum. These terms “signify a force or forces, cre-
ated both naturally and supernaturally, acquired in a de facto or de 
iure manner, and which are not, but may be, actualized or realized” 
(Sánchez 39).
As a result, Azpilcueta defines power as a proximate faculty or 
ability to do something (namely, to govern), while the office (officium) 
of the sovereign is the actualization of that very faculty. Vitoria simi-
larly holds the view that “public power is the authority or right of 
government over the civil commonwealth” (1991a 18). This power, 
inasmuch as it is a potency belonging to the community itself, is 
conceived as being unitary and indivisible. The actual realization of 
that potency and power, however, may be articulated through one or 
more offices, as when Hobbes similarly held the “The Office of the 
Sovereyn” may consist of “a Monarch, or an Assembly” (cf. Hobbes Pt. 
II, Ch. 30 376) Hence, Sánchez rightfully holds that “the power of the 
state is indivisible as a potency of the community, but divisible in the 
actual determination of offices” (Sánchez 43).
Lissarrague’s view of this follows a similar interpretive path. He 
sees Spanish political theory, especially its theory of public power, as 
embodying the distinction between essence and existence. Power as 
essence comes from God but pertains fundamentally to the commu-
nity. Power as existence, however, is the result of a concrete realization 
of that essential power in a concrete office. It represents “the manner 
in which [power] articulates itself in reality” (Lissarrague 69).
This position must not be viewed as asserting the doctrine of the 
Divine Right of Kings; it is merely a statement pointing to the onto-
logical status of political authority, one which underscores the Divine 
authorship of public power but which does not simultaneously furnish 
the office of the sovereign with unlimited power. Such power is always 
limited by the question of the teleological nature or end of political 
authority. To cite merely one other example, Juan de Mariana (De Rege 
et Regis Institutione 1599), similarly limits royal power and establishes 
that both natural and positive law restricts such power (cf. Sánchez 140-
141). It is a keynote feature of the Spanish conception of the State, as we 
shall see below, that the office of the sovereign is always guided by the 
task for which it was created, and any deviation from what is conceived 
as the proper, or natural moral direction of the state results in tyran-
ny.7 The idea of Divine authorship of political power stands in stark 
contrast to the positivistic assertions in this regard. To assert Divine 
7 Hence, thinkers such as John of Salisbury, Aquinas, Manegold of Lautenbach, 
Marsilius of Padua, and Almain, had already developed statements regarding justi-
fiable resistance to tyrannical rule. See Luscombe (768-770).
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authorship is equivalent to saying that all positive arrangements, legal 
or institutional, are ordered by a higher standard, and it is in this regard 
that one may clearly see Spanish thought as a principal purveyor of the 
tradition of intellectualism or iusnaturalism in the philosophy of law.
In any case, Vitoria further argued, “the material cause on which 
this naturally and divinely appointed power rests is the common-
wealth. The commonwealth takes upon itself the task of governing 
and administering itself and directing all its powers to the common 
good” (Vitoria 1991a 11). In other words, the primary bearer of public 
authority is the social body itself, which has received it from God. 
The reasoning behind this argument, and its concomitant impli-
cation, may be stated briefly as follows: no single individual or group 
may be naturally entrusted with public authority for no one may be 
considered as naturally superior to others (all men are, by natural right, 
equal to one another) (cf. Brett 132).8 From this position, it follows that 
public authority is entrusted to the entire Republic or commonwealth 
itself. This power is vested in the community whose task is that of 
providing the social order with an agency for self-defense. This means 
that such authority as is vested in the community must carry out the 
primary tasks associated with sovereignty: that of governing society, 
and of duly punishing those bent on dissolving its integrity. Public 
authority, understood as the office of the sovereign, is hence a coercive 
power or force directing society to its natural ends while endowed 
with the legitimate means providing for its self-defense.
The Organic Conception of the State
This ontological conception of public power emphasizes the 
directive role of public power and its hierarchical nature. Here, the 
state is conceived, in the terminology of the Middle Ages, as a “mysti-
cal body” or corpus mysticum, a concept that did not wane toward 
the end of the Middle Ages but rather grew.9 It persisted in Spain 
through Alfonso X’s Siete Partidas as glossed by Gregorio López (Las 
siete Partidas del Rey don Alfonso el Sabio, glosado por el licenciado 
Gregorio López, Salamanca, 1555) (cf. Sánchez 35). López’s gloss estab-
lished the king as the head of the community directing its members. 
The idea not only established the hierarchical and unitary nature of 
the state but also emphasized the idea of kingly or princely power as 
8 This is also Urdanoz’s view found in Vitoria (1960 121). Vitoria himself thus suggests 
“if no one was superior to any other before the formation of cities, there is no reason 
why in a particular civil gathering or assembly anyone should claim power for him-
self over others” (Vitoria 1991a 11). 
9 Vitoria does not discuss this concept but it is clearly an implicit feature of his 
doctrine.
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being an essential part or member of a greater whole (id. 36). The doc-
trine is clearly outlined in Sebastian Fox Morcillo’s De regni regisque 
Institutione (1556) and in Domingo de Soto’s De Iustitia et iure (1580). 
The manner in which the mind guides the activities of the various 
members of the human body is a standard analogy for describing the 
ordering of human society through the office of the prince. This idea 
accentuates once again the assertion that political power, in its vary-
ing subordinate or super ordinate forms, embodies a functional unity 
whose primary end is the common good.
However, it is also the case that such unity implies the persistent 
claim that political power is not above the community, not detached 
from it, and not exempt from its own edicts and laws. Hence, Soto’s 
claim that “the prince is not separate from the community but rather 
a part of her, although in a position of pre-eminence as its head” 
(Soto, cited in Sánchez 37). I must disagree then with Skinner’s recent 
contention that Vitoria’s thought can be associated with “absolutist 
theory” (cf. 2009 329). If a defining trait of absolutism is the idea of 
rule without restraint, as in Hobbes’ characterization of the sovereign 
as not being bound by the civil laws that are of his creation,10 then a 
similar case cannot be made demonstrating the absolutist tempera-
ment of Vitoria’s sovereign. Vitoria thus embraced Soto’s position 
when he established that “laws passed by a prince also bind the prince 
himself, even if he is the king […] the king is free to make laws as he 
chooses, but cannot choose whether to be bound by the law or not” 
(Vitoria 1991a 40).
The background to this outlook in the history of political thought 
is not difficult to pinpoint. Roman law had initially established that 
a ruler is free from the laws (legibus solutus) and that his will has the 
force of law. Indeed, the late eleventh century revival of Roman law 
described the prince or emperor as the sole source of law (cf. Luscombe 
763). Another theory emerged, however, namely that the people had 
only conceded authority to the emperor by way of a concession. This 
had led to the perception, among several writers, that the authority of 
rulers was largely subject to established laws (id. 764). For example, 
John of Salisbury and Bracton held that rulers should legislate follow-
ing the precepts set forth by considerations of justice. By the sixteenth 
century, Jacques Almain held that the authority bestowed upon a 
ruler could never be absolute and that, as Luscombe argues, “although 
10 In Pt. II, Ch. 26 of Leviathan, Hobbes argues: “The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, 
be it an Assembly, or one Man, is not Subject to the Civill Lawes. For having power to 
make, and repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjec-
tion, by repealing those Lawes that trouble him, and making of new” (Hobbes 313).
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monarchy is the best form of government it is limited by being a rule 
over free men” (ibíd.). 
The contention that a ruler is subject to the laws of the community 
is equivalent to asserting one of the limits surrounding the exercise of 
political power. While it is true that this theory of the state allows rul-
ing authority, on extraordinary occasions, to annul the precepts of the 
Decalogue11 (as when public power may authorize killing as legal pun-
ishment, or killing in war when a competent public authority declares 
the latter) such determinations must take place within the parameters 
of natural right and justice.
To this extent, I have expounded Vitoria’s political doctrine 
in terms of the general duties of the state toward political society. 
However, this also extends to the idea of the rights pertaining to the 
state itself when viewed as a sovereign political organization.
The Sovereign Status of the State
The organic conception of the state implicit in Vitoria’s politi-
cal writings underscored, as I have suggested, the idea of a whole, a 
communitas perfecta, brought into unity by its governing authority, 
whose self-sufficiency enables it to pursue its natural ends. This idea 
of a “perfect community” logically involves an attendant conception 
of internal and external sovereignty.
While the formulation of the concept of sovereignty is conven-
tionally associated with the emergence of the modern states-system 
culminating in its political formalization with the Westphalian 
settlement of 1648, early conceptions are already found in medieval 
writings as in the idea of the prince who recognizes no superior. The 
first expression is to be found in Cassidorus, between the fifth and 
sixth centuries (cf. Sánchez 72), which emphasized the pre-eminence 
of the king inasmuch as others did not consider his acts as being the 
object of scrutiny.12 
In Spain, this idea of independence was outlined in Alfonso X’s 
Espéculo, where he examined the faculties of kings, counts and judges 
to enact legislation. There exists, in his account, the notion of a hier-
archy that culminates in the office of the king or prince (all other 
offices being inferior to these) and in the idea that there is no temporal 
authority higher than that of the ruler (cf. Sánchez 72). By the six-
teenth century, under the reign of Charles V, the term “superior” was 
firmly established in the political literature highlighting the temporal 
11 This idea, Sánchez notes, would give rise to the doctrine of Reason of State (cf. 50).
12 On this point see A.F. von der Heydte, cited in Sánchez (72).
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authority of the prince or king as recognizing no higher authority.13 
Vitoria does not directly address this point in De potestate civili, but it 
is wholly implicit in his treatment of public power, and is overwhelm-
ingly discussed by the theologians and jurists who elaborated their 
thoughts on the state based on Vitoria’s doctrine of state power.14
In Vitoria’s political thought, the idea of the perfect community 
is grounded upon the Aristotelian and Thomistic notion of self-suffi-
ciency of political society. Vitoria had noted this in his commentaries 
on Aquinas’s Summary of Theology: “What do we call a republic? 
We answer that, according to Aristotle, the republic should be self-
sufficient” (Vitoria, cited in Naszalyi 134-135). The content of that 
self-sufficiency is quite specific and is indicative principally of its 
capacity to right wrongs and of its capacity for self-defense through the 
exercise of its jurisdiction and authority. Vitoria thus argues in On the 
Power of the Church that the civil community is self-sufficient and that,
[h]ence it may defend itself and protect itself from harm by anyone 
whatever, and carry the laws necessary to this end on its own authority. 
The argument is confirmed by the fact that princes may protect their 
own commonwealth from offence (inuria) by any other commonwealth, 
not merely by self-defense but also by exercising their authority […] and 
this includes offences by the clergy. (Padgen & Lawrence 107)
This reflects a number of problems concerning the power of 
Church authority, within a context of religious unrest and violence, 
and the capacity of civil power, as opposed to ecclesiastical power, to 
redress certain offences committed in this setting. But once again, in 
De iure belli, the subject is taken up in the following manner:
The commonwealth has the authority […] not only to defend itself, 
but also to avenge and punish injuries done to itself and its members. 
This is proved by Aristotle’s dictum that ‘the commonwealth should be 
self-sufficient (sibi sufficiens)’ (Politics 1280b33-35); the commonwealth 
cannot sufficiently guard the public good and its own stability unless 
it is able to avenge injuries and teach its enemies a lesson, since wrong-
doers become bolder and readier to attack when they can do so without 
fear of punishment. So it is necessary for the proper administration of 
human affairs that this authority should be granted to the common-
wealth. (Vitoria 1991c 300)
13 In the diplomatic correspondence of the time, the term is used very frequently. See, 
for example, “Cédula de 8 de abril de 1453” (Enrique IV 45).
14 For a concise summary of this in Domingo de Soto, Martín de Azpilcueta, Gregorio 
López, Diego de Covarrubias, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Fernando Vásquez de 
Menchaca, see Sánchez (72-111).
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The idea of the perfect community, or that degree of self-suffi-
ciency which is the keynote feature of the communitas perfecta, is 
associated with the dominium characteristic of public power, or of 
governing authority. That self-sufficiency, as Naszalyi notes, is but 
“certain jurisdiction, authority, or faculty, that is, a right” (emphasis 
mine). Vitoria’s position on this question is also perfectly clear: “a tem-
poral commonwealth has the right, if there is no other way to preserve 
its safety and well-being, to exercise its own jurisdiction and author-
ity” (Padgen & Lawrence 94). The significance of such jurisdiction 
and authority, indeed of the political power of the ruling institution of 
government, the office of the prince or king, lies precisely in its ability 
to preserve the community, to defend it against acts that threaten its 
integrity, for “otherwise its power would be crippled and insufficient 
for its own purpose” (ibíd.). However, the underlying purpose, or 
end, of power is not merely self-defense (though self-defense is inti-
mately linked as a means to that purpose) but the peaceful unity of 
the human consortium under the aegis of public power (cf. Naszalyi 
136); the achievement, in fact, of the common good (cf. Sánchez 51-52). 
Here, I believe we witness the construction of a modern paradigm 
of the state in European political thought. The new particularism 
of European politics, i. e. the dissolution of the idea of a Respublica 
Christiana and the de facto creation of discreet political communi-
ties, paved the way for the forging of political theories that extolled 
the virtues of sovereign independence between republics, and even 
between these and Papal authority. It is thus a common mistake to 
view Vitoria as either wholly medieval, or backward-looking, in his 
outlook.
Vitoria’s thought on these matters was unambiguous. He saw in 
the existence of these two authorities (temporal state and Church) 
two distinct purposes and two distinct jurisdictions. While man’s 
life is ordered toward God or spirituality (more so than to the very 
community in which he lives) (cf. Lissarrague 31) the political author-
ity to which he is subject does not assume the task of fulfilling his 
spiritual needs or ends but rather takes it upon itself to oversee the 
general conditions of social life within which man temporally exists 
(ibíd.). The general implication of this view, which Vitoria drew from 
Bellarmine (cf. Naszalyi 129), was that the Church had no temporal 
jurisdiction over political communities (only indirectly so in matters 
concerning the role of power in moral or spiritual questions within 
Christian communities) (id. 129-130).15 Thus, Vitoria’s assertion that 
“the emperor [and Pope, Vitoria would also state] is not master of 
15 A lucid discussion on this question may be found in Carro (1947).
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the whole world” in De Indis (Vitoria 1991b 253) is predicated upon 
the view that dominion may only exist by “natural law, divine law, or 
human law” (ibíd.); and it was clear that neither the Church, nor any 
single person, possessed such dominion by any of these means. 
The idea of a ruling authority as recognizing no superior, the 
organic conception of the state in which a potestas brings society into 
unity and directs that very society toward determinate ends (justice, 
the common good, peace), and the accompanying notion that self-
sufficiency is the ability to licitly punish wrongdoers and to defend the 
state against illicit attack or intervention, furnishes Vitoria’s political 
theory with distinctively modern attire. These traits, rather than a 
defense of monarchy or of absolutism, are a construction of the state 
as a sovereign entity, and imply two conditions which describe that 
sovereign status: a) that the state is not part of any other state, but 
rather a whole unto itself; and b) that the whole provides the con-
ditions under which the state organizes its collective life, generating 
its own laws, administering justice, and directing that very whole to 
its natural ends. “A perfect community or commonwealth”, Vitoria 
notes in De iure belli, “is therefore one which is complete in itself; that 
is, one which is not a part of another commonwealth, but has its own 
laws, its own independent policy, and its own magistrates” (Vitoria 
1991c 301). Vitoria thus described the modern notion of internal and 
external sovereignty, and in this manner, unveiled, as Naszalyi notes, 
“the superiority of the state in matters relevant to it, even above and 
against spiritual authority; a superiority that is a keynote feature of 
the sovereign state, that is, the capacity to realize its particular inter-
ests independently” (145-146).16 
The emergence of this principle, which placed emphasis upon sov-
ereign independence as a principal trait of the European state, quickly 
gained broad acceptance in European political and legal thought. 
However, Spanish thinking on the state, as against the “heresy” of 
naked and unbridled power, and above and beyond its dismissal of 
Lutheranism, became a specific enjoinment regarding the ethical pre-
cepts that should instruct and inform all men and sovereign powers. 
Despite the Catholic origin of these ideas, which may or may not have 
found broad appeal, the very denial of church authority in the tempo-
ral realm, coupled with the assertion that the nature of man, his rights 
and duties, is but the nature of the sovereign state and governing hier-
archy in its rights and obligations toward society, proves, I believe, to 
be a modern argument forging, in a sense, an essentially secular state 
architecture, and, moreover, an unwavering critical attitude toward 
16  On the modern nature of Vitoria’s conception of the state, see Scott (1934 35).
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power that is also constitutive of contemporary critical statements 
regarding state conduct.
Conclusion
Vitoria’s political thought grounded its conception of the state in 
a naturalistic vision of political life. The natural origin and necessity 
of the state and government implied a natural right and moral faculty 
to govern and defend itself against illicit aggression, and to apprehend 
the common good in society. A chief claim of his thinking was that 
political power and dominion are a representation of the dominion 
and moral faculties of natural man. These faculties incline both man 
and state to the social realization of their natures, which, in Vitoria’s 
teleological view, tend toward the attainment of the common good, 
justice, and peace. Such a view was based on the presumption that 
men cannot live in isolation and that there must exist a ruling author-
ity, whatever its particular form, that makes social life possible and 
is at the service of men and their individual and collective flourish-
ing. This, in turn, meant that government has, as a key check on its 
conduct, the principles of natural right from which even the summa 
potestas cannot divest itself. It is a central tenet of this Thomistic 
natural law argument that the sovereign state itself finds its justifica-
tion in its ability to serve the community of men that comprise it. Its 
modern attire becomes ever more pronounced if we see this last state-
ment as a first assertion regarding the role of government in providing 
security for the society over which it must invariably rule. Since then, 
political philosophy would argue in similar terms.
Nevertheless, the evolution of natural law thinking after the 
Spanish segunda escolástica led to a radical transformation of the 
basis of state theorizing. The idea of the inherently social nature of 
man and his concomitant ability to grasp the nature of law, whose 
ultimate source was to be found in the divine, was replaced by 
rational empiricism, philosophic individualism and, as in Hobbes’s 
philosophy, an assertion of the wickedness of man placing him in a 
theoretically baleful predicament. Rommen rightfully argued that the 
result was that,
[t]he state, together with its law which has its source in the absolute 
will of the sovereign, is the savoir of man from the natural law of “might 
is right”; it affords security and protection by monopolizing all power; 
and it demands as a price strict obedience and subordination through 
identification of natural law with positive law (Rommen 76).
Here, the idea of natural sociability and the teleology of ruling 
authority were substituted for an anarchical “state of nature” governed 
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by the passions. The state thus became entrusted with the task of fur-
nishing order and with establishing itself as the “Mortall God” whose 
will would become the ultimate source of law (cf. id. 76-77). 
The upshot of this line of thinking was to sustain a systematic 
attack, in typical nominalist fashion, against this kind of natural law 
by denying the assertion of universal or “otherworldly” norms as gov-
erning human social behavior or political power. This assault, in turn, 
allowed empirical reason to justify particular forms of authority and 
social relations not necessarily based on the permanent or immutable 
precepts espoused by Thomism.
But the consequences of Spanish thought for the study of the 
history of political ideas have never been quite far-reaching. Nor has 
Spanish political thought ever achieved a status worthy of extended 
and systematic scholarly analysis in the English-speaking academy. 
Whatever the reason for this, what did remain was a mode of think-
ing that has re-emerged in debates on human rights, legal philosophy, 
international law, and war. In this respect, I believe Spanish thought 
to be not merely of casual interest but of historical importance in the 
shaping of the past and present. Broadly speaking, it seems to me that 
an enquiry into the history of political ideas has as a chief aim under-
standing not only particular historical contexts but also the current 
structure of beliefs shaping the contemporary political world. That is, 
even in the immediacy of the present the weight of past systems of 
thought presses itself, often without our knowledge, upon the fabric of 
current theorizing in philosophy, ethics and law. It might be argued, 
therefore, that in order to understand contemporary liberal thought 
we might find it incumbent upon ourselves to look at Locke, Mill, or 
Kant as a way of comprehending the origin of our thinking on the sub-
ject. Likewise, if we wish to understand, for instance, contemporary 
human rights thinking or the nature of contemporary international 
law, we might do well by examining thinkers such as Vitoria, Soto, 
Suárez and other Spanish writers who offered more than brief sketches 
on the inalienable rights of man, international relations or the nature 
and purposes of the state. 
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